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With the development of corporate governance-related research, the interest 
conflicts between controlling shareholders and small, diversified shareholders become 
the main agency problem, especially in the imperfect legal protection environment. 
Therefore, how to protect investors’ rights attracts the attentions. Dividends have been 
paid as an important way to reduce agency costs. However, in unique institutional and 
legal settings, dividends can also be an instrument of controlling shareholders for 
expropriation. This paper investigates the dividend policy from the perspective of 
ultimate control rights and investor protection. 
Based on the agency theory, this paper analyzes the dividend policy made by the 
ultimate controlling shareholders in XiShui Strong Year Inner Mongolia Co., Ltd. The 
control rights of this company have been transmitted from a state-owned enterprise to 
a private firm. Study shows that: (1) Whether dividends are distributed or not, it can 
mean that controlling shareholders are seeking rent from minority shareholders. (2) 
Dividend policy stands for the requirement of controlling shareholders, with little 
regard for others. (3) When ownership is low, ultimate shareholders of state or 
non-state entities have the same incentive of keeping retained earnings. They prefer to 
gain private benefits through other ways, instead of dividends payment. 
In this paper, the relationship between dividend policy and investor protection is 
evaluated from different perspectives. It’s supposed to offer evidence of relevant 
theories, including agency theory and dividend theory. And it is also expected to make 
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 第一章  引言 











究报告显示，2008 年我国的投资者保护总体得分仅 5 分（满分为 10 分），与俄
罗斯、肯尼亚等 19 个国家并列第 92 位。而其中的股东诉讼指数仅得 4 分，与伊








2001 年 3 月 28 日，中国证监会颁布《上市公司新股发行管理办法》，规定







































































































































第一节  理论基础 










Berle 和 Means 所描述的那样高度分散。Classens et al．（2000）[10]对东亚国家和
地区 2980 家上市公司的股权结构进行分析，发现其中 2/3 的公司的股权是集中






了其控制权（La Porta et al．，1999；Classens et al．，2000；Faccio et al．，2002；



































第二节  文献综述 
一、股利政策与投资者保护的关系 
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